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It is quite rare for a legal issue to truly touch upon the lives of every 
person in our country. In the world of scholarship, nuanced questions of 
theory and procedure often take center stage, while realistic applications 
may seem distant from the overall thesis. 
Yet, free speech is different. 
Few distinctly legal and constitutional creations engender the fervor, 
emotion, and misunderstanding that free speech causes among the public. It 
is the topic that all persons use, most persons claim to know, and few 
persons completely understand. When broached with the topic of freedom 
of speech, most individuals have an opinion and, frequently, also have an 
anecdote to accompany it. As a fundamental part of the human condition—
so tied to our higher intelligence—it is not only the ability to communicate, 
but also the inherent need to feel heard, to feel as if our individual thoughts 
prescribe value, that gives substance to free speech rights. 
Our founders so internalized such principles that they codified 
freedom of speech in our Constitution.1 With its rich history and constant 
use, free speech hardly goes a day without adapting as a concept. One of 
the most enriching aspects of the topic remains the ability for any person to 
add to its changing nature: George Maynard did it when he duct-taped his 
license plate to censor its language,2 Gregory Lee Johnson did it when he 
set an American flag ablaze to lambast the Republican National 
Convention’s politics,3 and Mary Beth Tinker did it when she wore an 
armband to school in protest of the war.4 Whether or not each changed free 
† Special Projects Editor, Northwestern University Law Review. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 708 n.4 (1977). 
3 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989). 
4 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
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speech intentionally or completely unwittingly, these individuals added a 
dimension to our jurisprudence. 
In that certain way that the law shapes our civilization through the 
actions of few for the rights of the many, free speech has worked. And that 
is what has always drawn me personally to freedom of speech as a subject 
area. Tinker was the very first Supreme Court opinion I ever read—as a 
journalism student in high school, no less. I had not previously appreciated 
the full power of being an individual in this country, and even more so, the 
power of the legal system to safeguard a fundamental part of being human. 
I was so inspired, not just by Mary Beth Tinker herself, but by the Supreme 
Court Justices who carved out the trench for student free speech.5 Though 
every law student will finish school with a complicated relationship with 
each Justice whose cases we internalized, I value the way the Court treats 
the individuals in its free speech opinions. 
When the time came for the Northwestern University Law Review to 
pick a symposium that we felt would advance the field in a meaningful 
way, the lens of free speech emerged as a natural choice. When students 
join an institution, their mark may be as fleeting as their tuition money; 
however, when students become an institution, such as with their 
contributions and membership to a journal like the Northwestern University 
Law Review, they get the opportunity to interact with and shape the 
changing legal scholarship in the very same fashion that individuals 
augment free speech. For a group of student editors working steadfastly to 
make our mark on legal erudition, there is no greater contribution for a 
focused symposium than on the topic of the freedom of speech. 
Therefore, once we came across Professor Alexander Tsesis’s 
proposal for Free Speech Foundations, our board was taken with the 
intricacy of the ideas that its development would embody. In a very 
metacognitive sense, our journal would be promulgating our own free 
speech through the topic of free speech methodology. We knew that this 
theme would speak to the scholars, students, and practitioners that 
frequently reference our journal for the most pressing and practical legal 
answers. The academics have given life to innovative ideas in this area, and 
by giving exposure to this wealth of theory in the proceeding articles, the 
Northwestern University Law Review is able to contribute to the field in a 
meaningful way. Through editing and publishing, we strive to address the 
issues that captivate the legal profession. We can only do that through the 
inspirations of the legal scholars who come to us with their pioneering 
5 The ability of students to push the boundaries of free speech law into new territory continues to be 
a service to the legal field—even if the phrase, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” does not touch upon the heart 
quite so strongly as wartime protests. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
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viewpoints that push the limits of the legal jurisprudence. Needless to say, 
the intellectuals who participated exceedingly impressed us throughout the 
entire process. 
As we began to compile the panel of professors who would eventually 
make this Issue possible, the original premise of Free Speech Foundations 
really began to take shape. For all the appeal that free speech provides for 
us as individuals, the methodology for solving the tough free speech 
problems has remained murky; the lines of reasoning for First Amendment 
cases do not always follow predictable paths. The scholars whose writings 
follow have attempted to parse the answers from the incongruous cases that 
plague the minds of those that follow the scholarship closely. Every 
sophisticated legal topic seems to eventually reach an impasse at the 
Supreme Court level, and while free speech is no exception, the following 
articles have done a remarkable job at making sense of freedom of speech 
methodology at a macro level. The articles succeed at suggesting 
methodology, painting cultural insight, crafting solutions, and predicting 
government action for the various free speech questions whose relevance 
grows each day in our tumultuous legal and political climate. By not only 
examining the free speech foundations themselves, but connecting those 
founding principles to the present needs of the public, this Symposium has 
achieved a level of insight that we could only hope for as editors. 
By immediately tackling the current challenges in judicial analysis, 
the first article, Professor Alexander Tsesis’s Multifactoral Free Speech, 
expertly crafts a methodology for examining free speech concerns that 
balances the countervailing considerations arising in any speech conflict.6 
Acknowledging the competing interests at the heart of a disagreement is 
not enough for a rigorous application of free speech law; Professor Tsesis 
proposes an approach that gives substance to the underlying interests of 
parties and the foreseeable consequences of a case’s resolve.7 
Though the recent Supreme Court cases have trended toward 
formalism under the Roberts Court, there is still room—or the possibility of 
a paradigm shift—in free speech precedent for a case-by-case balancing 
approach.8 Through his framework, Professor Tsesis proposes deciders 
consider: 
(1) whether the expression at issue is likely to implicate specific
constitutional, statutory, or common law harms; (2) whether the restriction on
speech is based on a historical or traditional doctrine; (3) whether any
6 Alexander Tsesis, Multifactoral Free Speech, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1017, 1020–21 (2016). 
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 1040–42. 
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government policies benefitting the general welfare weigh in favor of the 
regulation; (4) whether the regulation on speech closely fits the public ends 
that is sought; and (5) whether there are any less restrictive alternatives to 
achieving them.9  
The methodology takes into account the multiple considerations that 
become important in a speech conflict between the government and an 
individual in a way that preserves individual freedoms and gives credence 
to the importance of government interests, all while assessing any potential 
harm to our constitutional standing and society. 
The methodology proposed by Professor Tsesis fits snugly into a 
primary emphasis of the First Amendment—as articulated by several 
scholars—which is to “advance democratic self-governance.”10 However, 
Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat contemplates a purpose that reaches even 
further in The Democratic First Amendment.11 In his conception of 
individual involvement within conventional democracy, Professor Bhagwat 
suggests the paramount importance of an engaged citizenry that 
functionally uses its free speech to involve itself in government.12 The 
discussion of Thomas Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican philosophy in 
Professor Bhagwat’s analysis13 deeply touches on the appeal of this topic 
and the need of this discussion from the view of the Law Review in picking 
a symposium topic that would make a meaningful difference in legal 
scholarship. 
Calling attention to the sense of incompleteness that some narrowly 
tailored free speech opinions leave in their examination, The Democratic 
First Amendment addresses the roles that each of the five non-religious 
First Amendment principles—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and the freedom to petition—
play in the jurisprudence and methodology.14 Rather than confine our 
analysis to the publically prevalent Meiklejohn model of the First 
Amendment—one that contains simply a Speech Clause and Press 
Clause15—Professor Bhagwat explains, through his examination and 
9 Id. at 1036. 
10 Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2016);
see also Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 2353, 2362–63 (2000). 
11 Bhagwat, supra note 10, at 1098 (arguing that the self-government view is “radically 
incomplete”).  
12 Id. at 1099–1100. This feature is pivotal to the full democratic conception of the First 
Amendment. 
13 Id. at 1121–22. 
14 Id. at 1101–10. 
15 Id. at 1113. 
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comparison of several First Amendment models, that these constrictions 
have limited the depth of our thinking surrounding free speech 
foundations.16 As a legal system, we want to avoid an “impoverished 
vision” of the First Amendment,17 and this Issue aims to illustrate its greater 
nature. 
Expounding on the democratic conception of the First Amendment, 
Professor Jack Balkin emphasizes that cultural democracy embodies the 
dual notions of “protecting individual liberty” and “promoting democracy,” 
rather than dividing them.18 Many of the current prevailing theories 
surrounding the First Amendment eschew the role of culture as irrelevant 
or unimportant. However, Professor Balkin argues that current culture is 
valuable in involving the greater public in its own self-governance by 
providing context to the political landscape.19 As one of the functions of 
free speech and the First Amendment is to allow for the public to 
communicate their thoughts and concerns about and to their government, 
cultural democracy helps bridge the people to their representation through 
the media of communication with which individuals feel most 
comfortable.20 A First Amendment that is adaptive to cultural changes 
broadens its usefulness to the public it serves. 
After exemplifying the importance of culture in the existing First 
Amendment frameworks, Professor Balkin elucidates the different ways 
that constitutional freedom actually serves “legitimate state power.”21 By 
using this fundamental freedom, citizens can assist representatives in 
making the informed decisions necessary for effective state function; 
similarly, it helps the people to feel connected to their government and to 
avoid alienating them through uninformed state decisionmaking. Finally, 
the allowance of such a right acts as an acknowledgement on the part of the 
government that the voice of the individual is to be respected, in a show 
that the state’s primary function is to serve the people.22 Professor Balkin 
goes on to explain the implications of his analysis for commercial speech 
and its addition to the current precedential analysis.23 
16 Id. at 1119. 
17 Id. 
18 Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1054 
(2016). 
19 Id. at 1055.  
20 See id. at 1057. 
21 Id. at 1068. 
22 Id. at 1069. 
23 Id. at 1080–89. 
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The free speech rights implicated in individual self-governance appear 
prominently in Professor Andrew Koppelman’s A Free Speech Response to 
the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict.24 The intersection of free speech 
with regards to gay rights and religious liberty has remained a contentious 
topic in the time after Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act25—
which allows individuals and businesses to assert that their religious 
exercise has been substantially burdened as a legal defense, typically as a 
justification to turn away homosexual customers without threat of 
discrimination lawsuits—and the landmark Supreme Court decision 
legalizing gay marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges.26 Professor Koppelman 
hypothesizes what might happen if those with sincerely held religious 
beliefs use their speech to proclaim their views to the public—such as 
through a publically posted disclaimer—thereby allowing consumers to 
choose services based on beliefs that match their own.27 
With an innovative solution, however, legal consequences may follow 
as free speech is tempered by the existing law of harassment.28 An 
important facet of this issue going forward will be whether courts are able 
to properly parse antidiscrimination law from the nuances of free speech 
law.29 More importantly, where the Supreme Court might draw the lines of 
speech nonprotection around this issue is in question, as well as whether 
the Court will be “curiously disabled” from making a helpful ruling in this 
arena.30 Many writers of free speech jurisprudence struggle to pin down 
where one’s right of free speech crosses or subsumes another’s right of free 
speech or nondiscrimination. Professor Koppelman aims to help explain 
where the purposes of free speech fill in the uncertainty. 
Building on the rights of individuals theme, Professors Toni Massaro 
and Helen Norton take the theory of free speech jurisprudence into the 
hypothetical future in which computers develop such artificial intelligence 
capacity to compel their own freedom of speech.31 Society’s current 
ambivalence to the rise of computerized assistance for virtually every task 
makes the process of anthropomorphization to a rights-worthy being more 
likely as technology becomes more autonomous. Through explaining the 
24 Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 
110 NW. U. L. REV. 1127 (2016).  
25 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, IND. CODE § 34-13-9-9 (2015). 
26 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
27 Koppelman, supra note 24, at 1043–45.  
28 Id. at 1045. 
29 Id. at 1151. 
30 Id. 
31 Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 
110 NW. U. L. REV. 1171 (2016).  
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current free speech climate and weaving the potential rights of intelligent 
technology into the methodology, Professors Massaro and Norton propose 
a masterful network of technologically available free speech.32 
When fit into the arguments based on democracy and self-governance 
that are prevalent throughout this Symposium composition, the speaker’s 
identity—for AI in particular—is, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, subject 
to speech limitations.33 However, Professors Massaro and Norton’s greatest 
discussion for artificially intelligent free speech rights lies in the realm of 
autonomy, as it goes directly to the heart of the speaker’s purpose and 
ability to produce meaningful information.34 The thought experiment 
extends into the content of technologically independent speech and the 
framework that would be sufficient to tie the different free speech pieces 
together.35 Finally, approaching the potential risks of doling out speech 
rights to robots, the authors describe strict scrutiny’s effect on computer 
speech and the circumstances where computers might retain even more free 
speech protection than their human counterparts.36 
Finally, as more individuals attain speech rights, the government 
consequently gains more listeners for its own speech. In Professor Mary-
Rose Papandrea’s The Government Brand, readers gain insight into the 
ever-changing government speech doctrine.37 While the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from restricting individual speech, its purpose is 
not to limit the government’s own speech in any way. As such, Professor 
Papandrea guides readers through the entanglement of a state’s own speech 
through modern free speech methodology.38 As the ability of government to 
speak can act to disfavor the content of other individual speakers, the need 
for a doctrine becomes apparent.39 
Based on the Supreme Court’s record of decisions on the topic, it has 
become challenging to predict where the government speech doctrine will 
extend. From its traditional Summum test, in which government need only 
have the “final approval authority over expression on its property,”40 the 
Supreme Court turned on its heel in the more stringent Walker, when it 
openly declared license plates government speech without much 
32 Id. at 1177–84.  
33 Id. at 1184. 
34 Id. at 1180–84.  
35 Id. at 1191–94. 
36 Id. at 1192.  
37 Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1197 (2016).  
38 Id. at 1199–1200. 
39 Id. at 1202. Viewpoint based restrictions are typically prohibited under the First Amendment. Id. 
40 Id. at 1203.  
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consideration to the quasi-free speech aspects inherent to specialty plates.41 
Professor Papandrea walks through the history of government speech and 
the subjective reasonable observer test favored in Walker.42 By seizing on 
the wide open question as to how a reasonable observer is framed in a free 
speech context as opposed to the Establishment Clause context, Professor 
Papandrea draws an interesting juxtaposition of the guiding principles of 
the “mythical reasonable observer.”43 Wrapping up with the staggering 
ramifications that Walker may unveil for government speech, readers learn 
that such content-based restrictions on viewpoint could become more 
prevalent in a society that increasingly relies on the touch of government 
through its services.44 
As the Symposium pieces wind their way through free speech 
methodology, to scope, to individuality, to technology, and to government 
control, the full impact of such a broad range of scholarship becomes clear. 
At the Symposium presentation of Free Speech Foundations presented at 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law in October 2015, the attendees were 
able to witness firsthand the blending of these ideas, the cooperation among 
the participants, and the passion that each scholar felt for the chosen topic. 
It is mighty infrequent that such intellectual talent and corroboration can 
truly occur in a symposium setting. As readers make their way through the 
issue, we truly hope they notice and appreciate the footnotes of gratitude 
the participants dedicated to the program’s other authors for their insight, 
edits, and input. Few published symposia are able to produce a true agora 
of ideas, but the scholars wholly dedicated themselves to the art of the 
thought exchange, which helped us create a well-rounded and intuitive 
Issue. As editors of the Northwestern University Law Review, we were 
proud to present such a captivating conference in our own home. 
This Issue and presentation would not have been possible without the 
vibrant ideas and continuing guidance of Professor Alexander Tsesis, who 
trusted us to bring this complicated Symposium to life, and we cannot 
thank him enough for helping us put the pieces together. Likewise, the 
unbelievable support and help from our Editor-in-Chief, Meghan 
Hammond, cannot be oversold; thank you for the time, the effort, the 
endless emails, and the dedication to making this happen. Similarly, we 
could never have put on a symposium of such excellence without the truly 
innovative pieces by those scholars who dedicated their summers to writing 
41 Id. at 1210–11. 
42 Id. at 1212–22. 
43 Id. at 1219–21. 
44 Id. at 1228–36. 
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and speaking for us; thank you so much to Professors Jack Balkin, 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, James Lindgren, Andrew Koppelman, Toni Massaro, 
Helen Norton, Mary-Rose Papandrea, and Alexander Tsesis. This 
Symposium would not have been possible without the unwavering support 
from our own faculty and administrative team at Northwestern; thank you 
to Jim McMasters, Jim Speta, Janice Nadler, and Jessica Clements for 
making an event of this scale possible. Finally, to the Northwestern 
University Law Review staff, you can never receive the thanks and the 
credit you deserve for choosing to put your time and energy into this 
publication; thank you for making this Symposium a reality. 
Finally, to our readers, we implore you to read this issue, to mentally 
chew on its ideas, and to go forth and discuss your impressions. It is our 
vision to create an ongoing dialogue about this sincerely fundamental right. 
As lawyers, our profession is fruitless without free speech’s merits. As a 
journal, our construction is worthless without free speech’s power. And as 
a public, our liberty is illusive without free speech’s vitality. 
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